With a grade of A for response and F for prevention, the Secret Service, of course, will be the focus of the scrutiny every which way for allowing a young assassin to get within range of former President Donald Trump.
Lessons learned from the Trump assassination attempt may help prevent another of like kind. The burden of protection is not born by the feds alone, however. Local officers are needed. Those outside the orbit of the federal efforts at executive protection have some thinking to do on their own. Here are some key considerations.
Expect “need to know” constraints
Coordination between local agencies and the Secret Service before a Presidential visit is essential and well-practiced by this and most other federal agencies. Any agency assisting in Secret Service operations should have its own briefings internally, recognizing that the Secret Service will necessarily be siloed to some degree.
Contribute intelligence
The visitors are in your house. They’ll have a file cabinet full of intel, maps and emergency procedures, but you know the territory and the people. Listen to your patrol officers and investigators and value their input. Encourage them to contribute any information about people or places that could impact the security operation. When in doubt, point it out.
Entertain questions
Officers should be in “what if” mode. I was in a briefing on a Presidential campaign visit where assignments were handed out and the squad dismissed without discussion. I was assigned to a bridge but wanted to know if any of the motorcade might be headed that way as an alternate route. My question was answered when the Vice-Presidential candidate’s limousine sped passed my roadblock. Would have been nice to know.
Know your agency contact with the command post
On a Presidential detail, I noticed what appeared to be a vulnerability in a parking area with vehicles involved in the motorcade. The critical tactical channels were not shared with me, but I did have an operational channel to the command post coordinating local agencies. Advised of the vulnerability, an agent responded and conducted a fresh security sweep.
Avoid lone ranger decisions
If there was ever a shoot first ask questions later situation, protecting the President is it. Officers should be warned not to deviate from their position or be someplace they are not expected to be. This will avoid being mistaken for an interloper by a fellow officer. Making a fast move or redeployment without authorization or communication is a tactical risk that should be taken only if necessary to save the protection target.
Respect the role of remote perimeter points
Some officers working an operation may never see the dignitary or even the motorcade, but no assignment is too remote to be of value. That remote point may be part of an assailant’s ingress or egress plan, a rendezvous point, or an alternate evacuation route for the target. Such officers are more than uniformed traffic cones. Those disappointed by being away from the action should be encouraged to know the potential importance of their station so that they do not become bored or misdirected.
Know the rules of engagement
Is the margin of error different when protecting the President of the United States? Will collateral damage be accepted? Would you make a shot if you were the first to notice a young man in camo on the roof with a rifle? Get clarity for your officers.
All the 80+ federal law enforcement agencies are good at what they do. But so are you.
The Trump rally shooting demonstrated commendable actions like quick thinking by citizens, as well as shortcomings such as poor site selection and training gaps
